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Abstract
An increasing number of systems have been proposed or
deployed to the transit core of the Internet with the goal
of observing and manipulating traffic in flight, systems
we term Traffic Manipulating Boxes. Examples of these
include: decoy routing systems, surveillance infrastruc-
ture like the NSA’s alleged QUANTUM project, and
traffic shaping middleboxes. In this work, we examine
a new approach that a routing capable adversary might
take to resisting these systems: the use of economic pres-
sure to incentivize ISPs to remove them. Rather than
directly attacking the availability of these systems, our
attack inflicts economic losses, in the form of reduced
transit revenue, on ISPs that deploy them, while at the
same time incentivizing ISPs that do not.
We alter and expand upon previous routing around
decoys attack of Schuchard et al., by adjusting the pri-
ority given to avoiding TMBs. This reduces or elimi-
nates the key costs faced by routing capable adversary
while maintaining the effectiveness of the attack. Addi-
tionally, we show that since the flow of traffic on the
Internet is directly related to the flow of cash between
ISPs, a routing capable adversary is actually a powerful
economic adversary. Our findings show that by prefer-
entially using routes which are free of TMBs, some rout-
ing capable adversaries can inflict in excess of a billion
dollars in annual revenue losses.
1 Introduction
An increasing number of systems that manipulate
higher layers of network functionality from positions
in the middle of the network, located within transit
providers, have been proposed, designed, and deployed.
We term these devices Traffic Manipulating Boxes, or
TMBs. While some TMBs exist to provide simple im-
provements to the transit functionality of the network,
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others such as Decoy Routing [22, 26, 39], traffic shap-
ing [3, 40], and active surveillance boxes such as the
NSA’s alleged QUANTUM-INSERT project [8, 34, 38]
seek to use privileged position in the Internet to ob-
serve and manipulate traffic in a manner not intended
by either its sender or the autonomous system (AS) that
hosts its sender.
The question becomes, what can an AS, or even a
whole nation, that does not want its traffic to be ma-
nipulated by specific TMBs, entities we call resistors,
do to fight back? As shown by Schuchard et al. [35],
large ASes and nation-states can use their capability
to select which paths they utilize, and which they ad-
vertise to others, to launch a straightforward attack on
the traffic coverage of TMBs by simply routing their
traffic around deployers – ASes that have elected to de-
ploy those boxes – and refusing to send traffic to any
destination reachable only through deployers. This at-
tack, termed the RAD (Routing Around Decoys) at-
tack, defeats TMBs since they can neither observe nor
manipulate traffic that does not cross them. Recently
Houmansadr et al. [23] pointed out that ASes launching
a RAD attack incur added costs, possibly making the
RAD attack prohibitively expensive.
In this work, we consider how economic forces can
work for the resistor, rather than against it. Instead of
attempting to directly attack the availability of TMBs,
our resistors inflict economic damage on deployers, while
at the same time incentivizing ASes which elect to not
become deployers. Assuming transit ASes are rational
economic entities, these incentives will cause deploy-
ers to remove TMBs, accomplishing the resistor’s goal
of minimizing exposure to TMBs. This alternative ap-
proach to attacking availability has the added benefit
of not requiring the resistors to disconnect themselves
from portions of the Internet. In order for this strategy
to be viable we must accomplish two distinct goals.
First, we must adjust how the RAD attack func-
tions in an effort to remove the costs to the resistor.
The original RAD attack had no concern for the re-
sistor’s costs; namely, added infrastructure costs from
turning customer ASes into transit ASes, using paths
learned from providers over those from customers, and
increased path lengths. We present three alterations to
the RAD attack which adjust how the attack is executed
to successively eliminate each of these costs. This re-
ar
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duction in resistor costs is not achieved for free, as each
of these adjustments reduces the ability of the resistor
to find paths free of TMBs. We evaluate these altered
RAD attacks, along with the original RAD attack of
Schuchard et al., launched from four different resistors,
against several deployments, including the deployment
proposed to defeat the RAD attack. We find that our
lower cost RAD attacks are still able to find paths free
of TMBs, and therefore able to migrate a non-trivial
amount of traffic away from deployer ASes.
Secondly, we need to maximize the economic costs
the resistor can inflict on the deployers. Since TMBs
require a privileged position on the Internet, deploy-
ers need to be large transit ISPs. These ISPs generate
revenue by carrying network traffic, the exact thing a
routing capable adversary can manipulate. We propose
a new form of RAD attack with the goal of coercing
deployers to remove TMBs by inflicting economic loss.
This attack differs from the original RAD attack, in that
it does not directly reduce the exposure to the TMBs
themselves. This style of attack has a desirable prop-
erty: the resistor does not have to cut itself off from
any destinations on the Internet, it can instead tolerate
TMBs functioning while economic pressure builds. In
order to evaluate this, we develop a model of Internet
scale traffic flow, and build an approximation between
our simulated traffic and real world ISP revenue. Our
results reveal that routing capable adversaries are ex-
tremely powerful economic entities, the largest of which
are capable of inflicting a billion dollars in lost annual
revenue simply by making different routing decisions.
Contributions. We make three primary contributions
to the literature on Decoy Routing and Network Inter-
ference:
– We demonstrate new, reduced cost “Routing
Around Deployers (RAD)” attacks. Compared to
the attacks in [35], our attacks do not suffer the
costs demonstrated by Houmansadr et al. [23], while
retaining the ability to find paths free of TMBs.
– We introduce a new adversary model for resisting
the deployment of TMBs, the economic adversary.
We show that the economic adversary can impose
significant losses in traffic revenue and leverage op-
portunity costs to discourage targeted deployments
of TMBs.
– Within the context of the economic routing adver-
sary, we introduce a new RAD attack, the “reverse
poisoning attack,” which significantly increases the
losses suffered by deployers of TMBs in a targeted
deployment by diverting in-bound traffic to the re-
sistor (and its customer ASes) away from deployers.
The rest of this paper is laid out as follows. Section 2
will provide relevant background on TMBs, BGP, the
RAD attack, and its costs. Section 3 will present details
of our simulation methodology, example resistors, and
TMB deployment models. Section 4 will examine how
the original RAD attack can be altered to take resistor
costs into account. Lastly, in Section 5 we will develop a
new type of RAD attack where we harness the economic
power of routing capable adversaries to incentivize de-
ployers to remove TMBs from their network.
2 Background
2.1 Traffic Manipulating Boxes
Traffic manipulating boxes, or TMBs, are middle boxes
deployed to Autonomous Systems (ASes) that make up
the transit core of the Internet. These devices utilize
privileges in the transit core to observe or manipulate
traffic not originated by the owner of the middle box.
As covered in the introduction, there are several exam-
ples, both proposed and deployed, of TMBs, including
decoy routing [26], surveillance devices which actively
manipulate traffic in flight [8, 34, 38], and traffic shap-
ing boxes [3, 40].
We refer to the organization that actually wants
the TMBs placed on the Internet as the originator.
The originator places TMBs inside the infrastructure
of willing or compelled ISPs, which we refer to as de-
ployers. It is of course possible for the originator and
deployer to be the same organization; however, this is
often not the case. For example, in the case of decoy
routing, an outside organization concerned with provid-
ing censorship circumvention would be the originator,
not the ISPs hosting the Decoy Routers.
Originators have several costs, for example the price
of hardware, which they have to pay on a per deployer
basis. This means that they have to attempt to min-
imize the number of deployers while still maximizing
the amount of traffic that the TMBs can manipulate.
In order to do this, the originator needs to select de-
ployers that will see not only traffic addressed to them-
selves, but other ASes as well, hence the requirement
that TMBs be placed in the transit core of the Inter-
net. Additionally, originators will also have to defray
economic losses that deployers suffer as a result of in-
stalling TMBs. These side payments would resemble
those allegedly provided by the NSA to RSA Labs for
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the deployment of specific technologies [28]. These side
payments will be covered in detail in Section 5.
2.2 Routing Capable Adversaries
Some entities – in our context, ASes or coalitions of ASes
under the coordination of a nation-state – might not
want their traffic exposed to TMBs; we term such enti-
ties resistors. Resistors can achieve their goal by mak-
ing sure their traffic does not traverse deployer ASes.
Schuchard et al. [35] consider one such entity, a censor-
ing nation-state which wished to avoid giving its citi-
zens access to a decoy routing system. They introduced
the concept of a routing capable adversary, an adver-
sary who could make inter-AS routing decisions based
on the presence or absence of TMBs. For ease of termi-
nology, we call any path that crosses one or more TMBs
a tainted path. Conversely, any path which crosses no
TMBs is called a clean path.
The routing of traffic between different ASes is han-
dled by the Border Gateway Protocol [31], referred to
for the rest of the paper simply as BGP. BGP is a path
vector routing algorithm with policies. Essentially, BGP
works like a standard path vector routing algorithm;
routers receive paths from their neighbors to a given
destination, the “best” path is selected, and it is then
forwarded out to other neighbors. Where BGP differs
from standard path vector routing is in what constitutes
a best path and which neighbors a router will forward
that path to. In the case of BGP, these decisions are
impacted by the business relationship between the AS
and its neighbors.
In the attack of Schuchard et al., which we refer
to as a RAD attack for the rest of the paper, the
resistor takes advantage of the fact that most ASes have
multiple paths to a given destination. The RAD attack
forces ASes to alter standard BGP behavior, at times in
contradiction to business policies, in an effort to always
select routes free of TMBs. In this specific example, the
censoring nation could defeat the decoy routing system,
since users could not find a way to have their traffic
observed by the decoy routers. The RAD attack does
require the resistor to know which ASes are deployers.
This is achievable if the resistor can reliably “flag” traffic
as having been manipulated by TMBs, allowing a path
intersection attack to reliably locate the TMBs; see the
original work [35] for details. Section 6 contains a further
discussion of locating TMBs.
The ability to avoid TMBs comes at a cost for a
routing capable adversary. First, if it can not find a
clean path to a destination, the routing capable adver-
sary must cut off connectivity with that destination.
Second, the attack, as described originally, in some cases
causes increased financial costs for ASes, would require
fringe ASes to become transit ASes, increases the load
placed on certain links in the topology, and can cause
a general degradation of path quality. Many of these
added costs placed on the resistor were investigated by
Houmansadr et al. [23]. Both the loss of connectivity
and these additional costs are dependent on where in
the Internet infrastructure TMBs are deployed.
3 Methodology, Resistors, &
Deployment Models
Routing Model. To evaluate both the routing capabil-
ities of new resistor strategies and the economic impacts
of the resistor actions, we constructed a BGP simula-
tor 1 similar to those used in prior work [23, 35]. Our
simulator is essentially a collection of software routers
running BGP. For scalability reasons, and for consis-
tency with prior work, we ignore the internal topology
of each AS and treat them as a single BGP speaker.
This is acceptable since our strategies are agnostic to
intra-AS concerns (e.g. multi-exit discriminators and
path origin). Each of these routers faithfully executes
the full BGP decision making process: ingesting new
routes from neighbors, running path selection, and po-
tentially sending BGP advertisements in turn to their
neighbors. Our simulator has been validated for correct-
ness via the comparison of simulated routing tables af-
ter BGP convergence to those found in a collection of
Quagga [25] routers arranged in identical topologies.
The topology used in the simulation is from Caida’s
inferred AS relationships dataset taken from February
of 2015 [2]. This topology contains 49,755 unique au-
tonomous systems. IP block to AS mappings are built
using observations of routing tables taken from Route-
Views [32] collected at the same time as the AS rela-
tionship data. All Routers were configured to obey com-
mon routing best practices, including valley free rout-
ing policies [15, 18], honoring of hybrid AS relationships
and inferred partial transit agreements, and aliasing of
sibling ASes. Some measurement studies, most recently
Anwar et al. [13] have pointed out that routes observed
in the wild occasionally do not always conform to valley
free routing policies. In their measurements, they found
1 Our simulator code is currently publicly available, but the link
is withheld due to blind submission. If accepted a direct link to
the simulator source code will be provided.
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that when sibling relationships between ASes, hybrid
AS relationships, and partial transit relationships [20]
are considered a majority of routes, 64.7%, can be cor-
rectly predicted using no valley policies.
Traffic Model. In order to measure economic losses, we
simulate traffic flow through the Internet using the pre
and post RAD attack paths. To achieve this, we needed
an Internet scale model of where traffic originates from,
where its destination is, and how much of it there is.
We based our model on existing work, specifically that
of Gill et al. [19], supported by the measurements of
Labovitz et al. [27], the World Bank [11], PeeringDB [9],
and Sandvine [5]. This model takes into account both
the random host to host traffic distributed across Inter-
net hosts and traffic which is concentrated at extremely
large content providers such as Netflix and Google, so
called “super ASes.”
Simulated traffic units fall into one of two different
buckets. Traffic in the first bucket is marked as “host
to host” traffic, meaning that it neither originates from,
nor is addressed to, large scale content providers. The
second bucket of traffic represents traffic that originates
from large scale content providers and CDNs. Measure-
ment studies have shown that the overwhelming bulk
of this traffic flows from the CDNs to end hosts. In or-
der to build a model of relative traffic ratios between
these two types of we consulted the Sandvine Global
Internet Phenomena Report [5], which provides a re-
gion by region breakdown of an average user’s Inter-
net traffic. The percentage of traffic from large scale
content providers ranged from 30.0% percent for users
in the African region, up to 67.5% percent for users
in the North American region. The breakdown of the
most popular sources of content by region were provided
by Sandvine as well. These sources generally included
Youtube/Google, Netflix and Facebook. Traffic not at-
tributed to a specific destination was spread evenly be-
tween several other large CDN providers noted by pre-
vious measurement studies: Microsoft Azure, Akamai,
Limelight, and Baidu. In order to model which ASes
have CDN nodes locally, we referenced Netflix’s public
documentation for how it selects ASes to host content
providing servers [7].
In order to establish the relative values of traffic
leaving and entering ASes three data sets were com-
bined. Sandvine provides the amount of bandwidth con-
sumption from an “average” user in various regions.
This information was combine with the World Bank’s
estimation of the number of Internet users in each coun-
try to get relative inbound and outbound bandwidth on
a per nation state basis. In order to assign that band-
width to ASes, we first assigned each AS to the nation
state it primarily resides in. We then consulted Peer-
ingDB, which is a system that allows ASes to advertise
their willingness to peer with other ASes. ASes which
elect to participate in PeeringDB have the ability to
optionally disclose the average amount of inbound and
outbound bandwidth from their AS that peers should
expect. Of the roughly 49,000 ASes which exist in our
topology just over 6,000 report bandwidth estimates. In
order to establish relative bandwidth values between all
ASes a Random Subspace classifier was trained based
on AS features including AS degree, size of customer
cone, primary country of operation and size of IP space
advertised. The resulting classifier had a correlation co-
efficient of 0.71. Nation state bandwidth was divided
proportionally between member ASes based on this es-
timate of inbound/outbound bandwidth to peers.
Our experiments focus on billable traffic, rather
than total traffic. Billable traffic is every unit of traffic
an AS either receives or sends to a customer AS. We
focus on this traffic since each unit of billable traffic di-
rectly corresponds to revenue generated by the transit
AS, a result of the transit AS being paid by the asso-
ciated customer for carrying the traffic. The amount of
money a customer pays to have that traffic delivered
is typically established based on peak bandwidth con-
sumption. Intuitively, peak load should be proportional
to the total traffic sent in our simulation, thus total
costs will be proportional to simulated billable traffic
units in our experiments. The telecom industry consult-
ing group TeleGeography reported that total annual IP
transit revenue in 2014 was 4.9 billion US dollars [6],
allowing us to compute a ratio between simulated traf-
fic units and annual revenue of 1.66652×10−20 USD of
annual revenue per simulated traffic unit.
Resistors. We have selected four different resistors as
examples. A brief summary of their properties can be
seen in Table 1. Brazil is the largest in terms of mem-
ber ASes, but the second smallest in terms of unique
ASes it connects to. Our selection of Brazil was moti-
vated by recent fallout over the NSA QUANTUM pro-
gram. It is not far fetched, given current proposals [1],
that Brazil would elect to act as a resistor with relation
to surveillance related TMBs. China has a highly de-
veloped Internet infrastructure and has demonstrated
a willingness to take radical steps to attack censorship
circumvention systems in the past. Germany has ex-
pressed responses similar to Brazil’s when it comes to
US government surveillance. However, Germany enjoys
an order of magnitude more unique points of connectiv-
ity with the rest of the world, and 24 times the number
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Resistor Member ASes Adjacent ASes Provider ASes
Brazil 3140 162 57
China 255 292 59
Germany 1792 1372 142
Iran 399 21 14
Table 1. A comparison of relevant statistics for example resistors featured
in simulations.
of unique providers compared to Brazil. Iran represents
the least well connected, and consequently weakest, of
our resistors.
Deployment Selection. In this work we focus on two
types of deployments. First, we consider a targeted de-
ployment, where the placement of TMBs is done with
the goal of maximizing the amount of traffic from the re-
sistor which travels across tainted paths. Censorship cir-
cumvention systems are examples of TMBs that might
be deployed in such a manner. For example, one could
envision a theoretical deployment of decoy routers tar-
geting a repressive nation state such as China. Targeted
surveillance is another form of TMB that might utilize
this deployment strategy. In order to select which ASes
to deploy to, our originator first infers what BGP paths
the resistor is utilizing and weights those paths based
on an estimation (or measurement) of the amount of
traffic utilizing that path. Potential deployers are then
scored based on the weights of the routes they appear
on. The candidate AS with the largest score is then se-
lected as a deployer, all routes which are tainted by that
deployer are removed from the set of resistor routes, and
the other candidate deployers are re-scored against the
resistor routes which remain clean. This process is re-
peated until the desired number of deployers has been
selected. It is worth noting that in both this deployment
and the following deployment we did not limit our orig-
inator to selecting only ASes that reside in one nation,
instead we allowed the originator to deploy to any AS
outside of the resistor. For all of our resistors, a deploy-
ment of 10 TMBs resulted in more than 60% of the traf-
fic leaving the resistor initially utilizing a tainted path.
When deployments were larger than 40 TMBs all resis-
tors saw 80% of their traffic traveling through at least
one TMB. Figure 14, found in the Appendix, shows the
percentage of traffic leaving our resistors that utilizes
a tainted path initially when targeted deployments are
constructed in this manner for each resistor.
We also consider a global deployment where the
originator has the goal of maximizing the amount of
traffic passing over at least one TMB regardless of the
traffic’s source or destination. This type of deployment
would be utilized by mass surveillance programs. Selec-
tion of deployers for the global deployment occurs in
the same manner as it does in the case of a targeted de-
ployment with one change. Rather than only consider-
ing paths utilized by the resistor, all paths from all ASes
are considered. This means that, unlike the targeted de-
ployment where there is a different deployment for each
resistor, there is only a single unique global deployment.
This global deployment resulted in slightly less traffic
from our resistors crossing at least one TMB, but still
resulted in 80% of resistor traffic utilizing tainted paths
when at least 40 TMBs are deployed. The percentage of
traffic using tainted paths initially against our global de-
ployment is shown in Figure 15, found in the Appendix.
4 Reducing Resistor Costs
It is natural to ask if there is some way to reduce the
costs placed on resistors while not crippling their ability
to avoid tainted paths. In this section, we examine how
a resistor can launch less costly RAD attacks by altering
where it considers the existence of TMBs in the BGP
route selection process. We will evaluate the strength
of these attacks by examining how much traffic they
can move away from deployers compared to the original
RAD attack.
4.1 Levels of Resistor Strength
The BGP route selection process allows for multiple lo-
cations where a resistor can insert logic that takes into
account TMBs. In the original RAD attack TMBs were
taken into account before local preference, essentially
adding a rule of “Prefer clean path” to the decision
process. Additionally, a rule was added to the adver-
tisement decision process forcing an AS to advertise all
best paths to an adjacent AS if that AS was also a re-
sistor. Prior work [23] pointed out that resistors will
suffer increased costs as a result of launching the orig-
inal RAD attack. First, the change to route advertise-
ment policy would force some non-transit ASes to act
as transit providers, carrying traffic for other ASes. Sec-
ond, by considering path cleanness before local prefer-
ence, ASes might experience increased transit costs, as
some destinations reachable via routes learned from cus-
tomers would shift to non-tainted routes learned from
providers. Next, since path cleanness is also considered
before AS level path length, the resistor might select
some routes that have longer AS level paths, possibly
resulting in lower Quality of Service. Lastly, the resistor
will be forced to increase the traffic load on certain links
in the topology, possibly requiring the upgrading of the
physical network infrastructure.
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Original Local Path Tiebreak
Pref Length
Transit Yes No No No
Conversion
Increased Yes Yes No No
Cost
Increase Yes Yes Yes No
Path Length
Increased Yes Reduced Reduced Reduced
Link Load
Table 2. A comparison of the costs incurred by a resistor using various
strategies. The original Routing Around Decoys (RAD) attack and the
proposed resistors we evaluated are shown.
In this work we present three alternative resistor
strategies which seek to reduce these resistor costs. Each
of these strategies is successively less costly than the
last, but also less able to find non-tainted paths. A sum-
mary of the reduced costs of each resistor strategy can
be found in Table 2.
First, a Local Preference Resistor removes the
additional advertisement logic, leaving route selection
the same. By allowing ASes to use normal advertisement
rules, non-transit ASes will never be forced to become
transit ASes. However, the resistors lose the guarantee
that if at least one resistor has a clean path all resistors
will have a clean path.
A Path Length Resistor alters when clean paths
are preferred over tainted ones. Instead of doing this be-
fore Local-Pref, we could do it after Local-Pref but be-
fore AS path length. This would mean that in addition
to the cost reductions of the Local Preference Resistor,
an AS would never find itself in the position of using
routes from a provider in preference to routes from a
customer, preventing the resistor from experiencing in-
creased transit costs.
The Tiebreak Resistor takes this a step further
moving the check for TMBs to the end of the route selec-
tion process, directly before tie-breaking. This would, in
addition to the gains of the previous two resistor strate-
gies, eliminate selecting longer AS level paths.
4.2 Evaluation of New Resistors
In order for the resistor to inflict economic harm on de-
ployers, it must be able to successfully transition traffic
from tainted paths to clean paths, a process we refer to
as deflecting traffic. If our resistor is able to successfully
deflect traffic away from deployers, the deployers will
suffer economically. The originator of the TMBs will in
turn have to defray the costs suffered by deployers. It
should be noted that unlike Schuchard et al.’s original
RAD attack, in this scenario the resistor does not need
to find clean paths to all destinations. Instead, the resis-
tor needs to replace a sufficient number of tainted paths
with clean ones to create noticeable economic harm to
the deployers in an effort to incentivize them to remove
the TMBs. A discussion of how this new strategy works
against Decoy Routers and other systems where the ex-
istence of a single tainted path is sufficient for the sys-
tem to function is done in Section 6.
In this section, we cover how much tainted traffic
our resistors were able to deflect away from deployers,
and what the consequences were for path Quality of Ser-
vice. Financial costs to the resistor will be analyzed with
the costs to the originator of the TMBs in Section 5. We
simulated all four of our sample resistors, utilizing each
of our newly proposed RAD strategies and the original
RAD strategy, against both targeted and global deploy-
ments of various sizes.
4.2.1 Ability to Deflect Traffic
The fraction of traffic which originally crossed deploy-
ers that was successfully deflected by each RAD at-
tack can be seen in Figure 1 and Figure 2 for targeted
and global deployments respectively. As can be quickly
seen from the figures, the more costly RAD attacks are
more capable of deflecting traffic away from deployers in
all deployment scenarios. However, even the weakest of
the new RAD attacks manages to deflect some amount
of traffic in all scenarios except targeted deployment
against Iran.
The more well connected resistors (China, Brazil,
and Germany) are able to deflect traffic to varying de-
grees against both deployment models using all of the
RAD strategies outlined in Section 4.1. In the case of
China and Brazil the Tiebreak strategy is quite weak,
approaching zero deflected traffic, while Germany still
manages to deflect between 5% and 22% of tainted traf-
fic using this no cost strategy. The Path Length strategy,
which is the strongest financially free strategy for the re-
sistors, can deflect a large amount of traffic at smaller
deployment sizes, but can still deflect, depending on the
resistor, between 1% to 9% of tainted traffic for deploy-
ments of 100 ASes. Resistors gain between a 100% and
200% increase in deflected traffic on average by stepping
up to the Local Preference strategy in exchange for mon-
etary costs (see Section ??). The same level of gains are
seen moving from the Local Preference strategy to the
original RAD attack with the exception of Brazil, which
massively benefits from using the original RAD attack.
This is a result of the majority of small Brazilian ASes
multi-homing themselves with a geographically diverse
collection of ASes located outside Brazil.
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Fig. 1. Measured capability of our three lower cost RAD strategies, along with the original RAD attack to deflect network traffic from tainted paths,
resulting from deployments targeted toward each resistor, to clean paths. Note in Figure 1d that at deployment sizes of 20 or greater Iran is completely
surrounded.
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Fig. 2. Simulated ability for our collection or RAD strategies to deflect traffic in the face of a deployment of TMBs which aims to maximize the total
traffic observed, regardless of source or destination.
Iran is unable to deflect traffic against targeted de-
ployments of size 20 or greater since they completely
surround Iran. How Iran, or any other resistor which
finds itself in this scenario, is able to inflict economic
harm on the deployers will be covered in Section 5.3.
When considering a global deployment, even with its
small pool of available alternate routes, Iran is still able
to deflect traffic away from deployers. For the other re-
sistors, the global deployment is slightly more resilient
to RAD attacks compared to targeted deployments. Iran
also has the only instance of two of our RAD strategies
being essentially equivalent. The Local Preference and
Path Length strategies return nearly identical results
against a global deployment, a result of limited path
choices being available to the resistor.
4.2.2 Quality of Service
Three out of the four tested RAD attack strategies can
result in increased AS level path lengths. AS level path
length, while not a direct measure of latency or path re-
liability, has been utilized by prior work [23] in this area
as a rough measure of path quality of service. For the
sake of comparison we include measurements of mean
path length increase for paths which were changed dur-
ing the various RAD attacks against global deployments
in Figure 3. Results are similar for targeted deployments
and can be seen in Figure 16 in the Appendix.
In all cases, Germany sees a mean path length in-
crease of less than 1 AS. Brazil is the same with the
exception of the original RAD attack against a targeted
deployment, which has a mean increase of 1.5 ASes.
China sees an increase in these same ranges for the Lo-
cal Preference and Path Length strategies, but sees a
mean increase of roughly 2 hops for the original RAD
attack when deployment sizes are large. Iran sees no
path length increases for targeted deployments as the
resistor does not change paths when no clean paths can
be found. Confirming that which was evident by defi-
nition, the Tiebreak strategy results in no path length
changes in all cases.
More accurate measurements of path quality are dif-
ficult to achieve. We attempted to reproduce the latency
experiments of Houmansadr et al.from [23], but were un-
able to produce estimates for the latency of even 0.1%
of the changed routes using the method and data set
described in [23]. Accurately estimating the latency of
unused BGP routes seems to be an interesting question
that is beyond the scope of this work.
Increased traffic load across a subset of links in the
topology is an unavoidable consequence of altering the
route decision making process. However, the relative
magnitude of those increases can be mitigated by us-
ing lower cost strategies. Figure 4 shows the median
relative link load increase, and Figure 5 shows the 90th
percentile of relative link load increase as a fraction of
normal load, only links experiencing a load increase were
considered. Note that, unlike other plots in this section,
these graphs are clustered via resistor strategy rather
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Fig. 3. Mean AS level path length increase see attempting to route around a global deployment.
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Deployment Size
1.00
1.05
1.10
1.15
1.20
Fa
ct
o
rs
 o
f 
N
o
rm
a
l 
Li
n
k 
Lo
a
d
China
Brazil
Germany
Iran
(a) Original
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Deployment Size
1.00
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
Fa
ct
o
rs
 o
f 
N
o
rm
a
l 
Li
n
k 
Lo
a
d
China
Brazil
Germany
Iran
(b) Local Pref
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Deployment Size
1.000
1.005
1.010
1.015
1.020
1.025
1.030
1.035
1.040
1.045
Fa
ct
o
rs
 o
f 
N
o
rm
a
l 
Li
n
k 
Lo
a
d
China
Brazil
Germany
Iran
(c) Path Length
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Deployment Size
1.000
1.005
1.010
1.015
1.020
1.025
Fa
ct
o
rs
 o
f 
N
o
rm
a
l 
Li
n
k 
Lo
a
d
China
Brazil
Germany
Iran
(d) Tiebreak
Fig. 4. Median increase in link load when considering links which must carry additional traffic as a result of resistor reaction to a global deployment.
With the exception of the original RAD attack, no strategy results in more than a single digit percentage increase.
than resistor. The original RAD attack in all cases re-
sults in the largest link load increases of any strategy,
a natural result of utilizing customer links for transit
purposes. The other three strategies result in, with one
exception, a median relative link increase that never
exceeds a 5% increase in link load, meaning that the
majority of links are likely not impacted from a perfor-
mance perspective. The 90th percentile shows that, for
smaller deployments, some links experience a doubling
or tripling of traffic load. Recent measurements [17] have
shown that connection points between ASes are gener-
ally less than 50% utilized. It is likely in some extreme
scenarios exist where additional infrastructure would
need to be built, but those are the overwhelming minor-
ity of cases. The actual monetary cost to the resistor to
build this infrastructure is dependent on a large number
of factors and outside the scope of this paper. One phe-
nomena that might mitigate these financial costs is the
existence of large amounts of fiber connections which
are either under utilized or not currently utilized at all,
so called Dark Fiber [4], which could be tapped to pro-
vide additional capacity. Additionally, many of the links
which see large increases exist inside of Internet Ex-
change Points, or IXPs, where adding capacity, from a
technical perspective, is very straightforward.
5 Deployer Costs
In order for TMBs to be useful, deployers must be tran-
sit providers, a type of AS that generates revenue by
carrying traffic to and from their customer ASes. While
transit revenue is obviously not the only way ASes gen-
erate revenue in this work we focus exclusively on transit
revenue. As covered in Section 3, the amount of revenue
a transit AS generates from a customer is proportional
to the volume of traffic handled for that customer. Since
the RAD attack directs the resistor’s data away from
paths that cross deployers, by extension the attack also
directs the revenue that is generated by carrying this
data away from the deployers.
This observation opens up a new strategy for the
resistor. While the original RAD attack model focused
on directly undermining the availability of TMBs, our
new attack instead focuses on inflicting economic dam-
age on deployers with the goal of incentivizing them to
remove the TMBs. In this attack model our resistor is, in
the short term, willing to allow traffic to cross TMBs.
The resistor instead focuses on the long term goal of
inflicting economic losses so severe on deployers that
the originator lacks the resources to defray these losses,
and the only rational decision deployers can make is to
remove the TMBs. The rest of this section will mea-
sure how large the economic harm is from the traffic
deflection results presented in Section 4, expand upon
those attacks by taking steps to influence traffic going to
the resistor, and examine the added incentives to defect
from the ranks of deployers.
5.1 Direct Costs of Deployment
Using our simulator, we examine the RAD attacks of
Section 4 in terms of deployer revenue losses. To quan-
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Fig. 5. The 90th percentile of link increases for our resistors employing various strategies. These increases result from reaction to a global deployment.
tify these losses, we compute the amount of revenue
made by deployers before and after resistors attempt
to route around them. In keeping with the concept that
the resistor will not disconnect itself from any destina-
tion, during all of our simulations if a resistor can not
find a clean path utilizing its chosen RAD strategy, a
tainted path is utilized instead. The originator will need
to reimburse the deployers for revenue lost as a result of
resistor actions, and the sum of these reimbursements
represents the originator’s annual cost of deployment.
Figure 6 shows the originator’s cost of deployment
for targeted deployments against our resistors, and Fig-
ure 7 shows the cost of global deployments. We see
that the annual economic damage routing capable ad-
versaries can inflict, even using low cost RAD strategies,
ranges from hundreds of thousands of dollars to tens of
millions of dollars. To put those numbers in perspective,
consider the United States Broadcasting Board of Gov-
ernor’s Internet Anti-Censorship division, the branch of
the US government with the expressed task of acting as
the originator for systems like decoy routing. The total
budget in 2015 for this organization was 15 million dol-
lars [29].Thus, depending on resistor strategy, the
annual cost of decoy routing deployment would
equal or exceed its total operating budget.
As would be expected from the results of Sec-
tion 4.2.1, More aggressive RAD strategies result in
higher costs of deployment. For example, when look-
ing at a targeted deployer being resisted by China (Fig-
ure 6b), switching from a Path Length strategy to a Lo-
cal Preference strategy results in an average of 38% in-
crease in the cost of deployment and shifting from Local
Preference to the original RAD strategy gives an average
improvement of 81%. Other trends from traffic deflec-
tion graphs presented in Section 4 apply to these graphs
as well. For example, Brazil sees a massive increase in
capabilities when switching to the original RAD attack.
The raw volume of traffic a resistor generates, in
addition to what fraction of that can be deflected,
now plays a role in how well our resistors can influ-
ence the cost of deployment. For example, looking back
to Figure 1, Germany can deflect a higher percent-
age of its tainted traffic away from deployers. How-
ever, when we compare the resulting costs of deploy-
ment for Brazil, Figure 6a, to Germany, Figure 6c, we
see that for many sizes of deployment, the cost of de-
ploying against Brazil is actually larger than the cost
of deploying against Germany. While Germany can find
more clean paths, Brazil’s directly controlled volume of
traffic is larger than Germany’s, meaning that the clean
paths it finds can be more economically damaging to
deployers. Additionally, Brazil’s customers tend to have
fewer choices compared to ASes that are customers of
Germany, meaning that while Germany has a large cus-
tomer cone, the smaller customer cone of Brazil is more
likely to utilize Brazil’s post-RAD attack routes.
An interesting phenomena to note is that after a
certain size, larger deployments are actually less expen-
sive than smaller deployments. This is a direct result of
resistors being less able to find clean paths. The extreme
case of this is the targeted deployment against Iran (Fig-
ure 6d) where the RAD related costs fall to zero. How-
ever, the willingness to preferentially route using clean
paths results in a Prisoner’s dilemma like game, cre-
ating strong incentives for deployers to remove TMBs.
This game will be introduced in Section 5.3.
Two of the RAD attack strategies, the original RAD
attack and the Local Preference, inflict economic dam-
ages on the resistor as well as the deployers. Both of
the these strategies can force resistor ASes to utilize
provider routes over customer routes. In addition, the
original RAD attack can force customer ASes to provide
transit for their providers. We can measure these costs
as well utilizing our simulator. Figure 8 shows these
resistor costs for both strategies against targeted and
global deployments. We can see from the Figures that
the original RAD attack is strictly more costly than a
Local Preference strategy.
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Fig. 6. The cost of deployments targeted against specific resistors as a function of deployment size. This is an annual cost that would have to be paid by
the originator to defray lost revenue experienced by deployers.
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Fig. 7. The annual cost of a deployment maximizing global coverage of traffic when reacted to by each of the resistors.
5.2 Impacting Incoming Traffic
The costs of deployment presented in Figure 6 and Fig-
ure 7 were the result of resistors controlling traffic leav-
ing their ASes, but what about the traffic addressed to
their ASes? While BGP places the final decision about
path selection into the hands of the routers forwarding
traffic, there are techniques that give the destination
AS a measure of control over what routes are used to
reach their IP blocks. BGP hole punching is one such
traffic engineering technique. BGP allows ASes to ad-
vertise sub-blocks of an already advertised block of IP
addresses, treating these sub-blocks as a different des-
tination. We call these routes to sub-blocks of exist-
ing destinations hole punched routes. When a router at-
tempts forward a packet, it will use the path for the
most specific (i.e. smallest) IP block that contains the
destination IP address. In this way operators can specify
different path properties for a sub-block of IP addresses
through the use of hole punched routes.
Resistors can adapt this traffic engineering tech-
nique to cause other ASes to avoid sending traffic bound
for resistors through tainted ASes when able. The basic
idea is for resistors to generate and propagate a set of
hole punched routes which are guaranteed to not cross
any deployers. When an AS outside of a resistor for-
wards a packet to a resistor, if the AS has one of these
hole punched routes, it will always use it, causing traffic
that might have once traveled over a tainted path to
always use a clean path.
To do this, resistor ASes partition each block of IP
addresses into two sub-blocks. The resistor then adver-
tises three paths: the original path and a path for each
of the two sub blocks. The original path will spread
through the Internet normally and will be used in all
cases when ASes do not have a hole punched path. This
ensures that the resistor faces no connectivity loss. The
hole punched paths differ from the original path in one
key way: when the resistor advertises the path after his
ASN, he adds all known deployer ASes to the AS path,
then adds his ASN again. The resistor can do this since
no AS path integrity protection is provided in BGP.
The hole punched paths will propagate through the net-
work, but they will be rejected by deployer AS routers
as a result of BGP loop detection. This causes the hole
punched paths to grow around deployer ASes. The fact
that the deployer ASes appear in the path is irrelevant
for packet forwarding, since they appear after the desti-
nation AS. This technique ensures that if an AS has at
least one clean path to a resistor, it will always have a
clean hole punched route. We call this technique Fraud-
ulent Route Reverse Poisoning, or FRRP.
We re-ran our experiments with the addition of
FRRP for three deployment strategies: the original
RAD attack, Local Preference, and Path Length. The
Tiebreak strategy was not used in combination with
FRRP since any resistor using the Tiebreak strategy has
a goal of ensuring no increase in AS level path lengths.
As shown in Figure 19 and Figure 20, found in the Ap-
pendix, FRRP can result in a small increase in the AS
level path length for routes traveling into the resistor.
Figure 9 and Figure 10 show the costs of deploy-
ment for targeted and global deployments respectively
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Fig. 8. The annual costs experienced by resistors when using the original RAD attack and the Local Preference strategy. These costs arise from having to
reimburse resistor ASes for transiting traffic for their providers and added transit costs that come from migrating from customer learned paths to provider
learned paths.
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Fig. 9. The annual cost of targeted deployments against our resistors when both a RAD strategy and FRRP is used. Tiebreak strategy is not shown since
FRRP poisoning slightly increases path length, and so is incompatible with a Tiebreak strategy.
where FRRP is employed in addition to a RAD strat-
egy. FRRP increases the cost of deployment by
more than 40 percent in all scenarios. In many
cases the improvements are much larger, for example
China can roughly double the economic losses inflicted
on deployers by utilizing FRRP.
FRRP is made possible by the ability of the resistor
to falsify the existence of deployers in the AS level path.
This falsification can be done because of the lack of AS
path integrity protection provided by BGP. Even the
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [24], a par-
tially deployed system attempting to provide integrity
for route origination, provides no protection for the in-
tegrity of the path itself since the last ASN, the origina-
tor, is the correct ASN. BGPSec [14] would provide AS
level path integrity, preventing the FRRP routes from
being considered valid. In this case, resistors could not
rely on loop detection at the deployers to guarantee that
a hole punched path does not include any deployers,
defeating the scheme. While BGPSec is not currently
deployed, and thus not an immediate issue for a resis-
tor, we describe a weaker version of reverse poisoning,
Selective Advertisement Reverse Poisoning, or SelARP,
which does not require falsifying path information, and
would consequently still function if BGPSec were to be
deployed at some future date.
SelARP takes advantage of how BGP paths are
propagated through the topology. In BGP, routers will
decide if they should advertise a route to a neighbor
based on “Valley Free Routing” principles [18], mean-
ing that advertising a path to a single neighbor does not
guarantee that the route will be propagated to every AS
in a topology. Deployers can therefore, by carefully se-
lecting which neighbors they advertise the hole punched
routes to, avoid allowing hole punched routes to propa-
gate to deployers. Paradoxically, in some instances ad-
vertising a hole punched path to a neighbor which would
result in a deployer later in the topology seeing the route
is the optimal decision for the resistor, if prior to encoun-
tering the deployer the hole punched path manages to
steal away traffic from a different deployer. Because the
hole punched paths are not advertised to all neighbors,
the guarantee that we had previously of an AS which
has at least one clean path to a resistor always having
at least one clean hole punched route no longer applies.
The problem of selecting which subset of neighbors
to advertise the hole punched path to such that it max-
imizes the amount of return traffic avoiding deployers
appears to reduce to the set covering problem, which
is NP-hard. A greedy estimator can be built to pro-
vide a lower performance bound. This greedy estima-
tor considers every neighbor that does not have a hole
punched route advertised to it, tentatively advertises
the hole punched path to it, and measures the number of
ASes (weighted by IP addresses) that have a clean hole
punched route after the path is propagated by BGP. If
at least one neighbor increases the number of ASes with
a clean hole-punched path, the neighbor which results
in the most such ASes is then added to the set of neigh-
bors who receive the hole punched path. The topology is
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Fig. 10. The annual cost of a global deployment when resisted by both a RAD attack and FRRP.
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Fig. 11. CDF of the fraction of reverse poisoning costs that are retained
when SelARP is used. This test is done against targeted deployments of 30
ASes.
then permanently updated with the hole punched route
advertised to this neighbor. The process is repeated un-
til no more such neighbors can be found. This algorithm
is given in detail in the appendix.
We evaluated the ability of SelARP to influence
traffic in the face of a targeted deployment. While Se-
lARP is weaker, it still has the ability to cause
traffic which would previously traverse a de-
ployer to instead travel a clean path. The CDF of
the fraction of incoming traffic, previously deflected via
FRRP, which each resistor AS manages to still deflect
away from deployers by SelARP is shown fin Figure 11
for our sample resistors. As can be seen, for the three
tested resistors, the majority of member ASes are still
able to deflect some amount of incoming traffic using
SelARP. For Brazil and Germany nearly 20% of ASes
have identical reverse poisoning capabilities when us-
ing SelARP as they do while utilizing FRRP. More re-
fined methods for selecting which neighbors to advertise
hole punched routes to, along with additional techniques
such as making some hole punched routes appear less
attractive by artificially inflating path length might im-
prove these results and is left for future work.
5.3 Deployer Defection
If we revisit our traffic deflection graphs, Figure 1 and
Figure 2, we see that a large fraction of traffic has no
clean path after resistor reaction. An interesting sce-
nario occurs when there are multiple deployers who
present the resistor with a path to one of these des-
tinations. One of those ASes will have the best (i.e. uti-
lized) path, however resistors prefer clean paths over
tainted ones. If one of the deployers who is providing a
sub-optimal path to the destination removed its TMBs,
an action referred to as defection, its path would now
be the preferred path by virtue of being the only clean
one. By doing this, a defecting deployer steals billable
traffic away from other deployers. This means there are
actually not one, but two costs experienced by deploy-
ers when they agree to host TMBs. First, there is the
previously discussed loss in billable traffic that results
from paths they once provided migrating to clean ASes.
Second, there is an opportunity cost associated with the
billable traffic they could gain by defecting and replac-
ing other deployers as a best path provider, what we
term defection traffic.
When deployers force resistors to defray
these opportunity costs, the cost of deployment
increases by more than an order of magnitude.
Figure 12 shows the measured cost of targeted deploy-
ment when both the direct cost and the defection op-
portunity costs are considered. The original RAD at-
tack, Local Preference, and Path Length strategies, all
augmented with FRRP, are considered, along with the
Tiebreak strategy using no FRRP. These four combi-
nations represent a range of resistor costs ranging from
the willingness to invest several million dollars to com-
pensate member ASes down to no added cost.
The original RAD attack and Local Preference
strategy (both augmented with FRRP) represent the
strongest resistors. These resistors are exceptionally
powerful, inflicting losses in the hundreds of millions of
dollars, in the case of Brazil approaching 1 billion dol-
lars, and in the case of China exceeding 2 billion dollars
of annual cost to the originator. This amount of eco-
nomic harm is large, even when considering powerful
originators such as spy agencies. For example, China
would be able to require the NSA to pay out ap-
proximately 20% - 30% of its total budget [33] to
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Fig. 12. The cost of targeted deployments, including defection costs, when a RAD attack and FRRP is utilized. Note that unlike the prior costs, when
defection is considered, Iran is a viable resistor.
cover the cost of a large deployment. The finan-
cially free strategies can also inflict substantial losses.
For all resistors, the Path Length with FRRP strat-
egy yields costs of deployment at or exceeding roughly
100 million dollars annually. The free attack of simply
Tiebreaking based on path cleanness imposes annual
costs of deployment ranging from 15 million dollars for
Germany to 290 million dollars for China, in all cases
equaling or exceeding the total budget of the Broad-
casting Board of Governor’s Internet Anti-Censorship
division and other free speech advocacy organizations.
Two key differences should be noted when compar-
ing the costs of deployment including defection with
those ignoring defection. First, larger deployments are
no longer less costly compared to smaller deployments.
This is a result of the incentive for deployers to de-
fect increasing as more and more resistor traffic needs
a clean path. The second phenomenon, which is closely
linked to the first, is the emergence of Iran, shown in
Figure 12d, as a strong resistor. As covered previously,
the targeted deployment rapidly surrounds Iran with
deployers, which means that all RAD attacks fail. How-
ever it also means that nearly all of Iran’s traffic is
up for grabs for any adjacent AS that elects to defect.
This demonstrates the difficulty faced by the originator
strategy of “blockading” a target. While establishing the
blockade may be simple, maintaining it is costly.
6 Discussion
Alternative Deployment Strategies. Instead of a
nation state acting as a resistor, it could alternatively
act as a deployer. For example a government could have
all ASes inside of a country deploy TMBs. This would of
course trivially prevent clean paths from being found to
any destination inside the country. On the surface this
appears to be an effective deployment strategy, as resis-
tors can not find alternative paths to any destinations
inside the nation. However, the interconnected nature
of the Internet means that quite often a large fraction
of traffic flowing through a transit AS is bound for a na-
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Fig. 13. A CDF of the fraction of transit traffic bound for a destination
that is international relative to the transit AS.
tion other than the one the transit AS resides in. While
it is true that all of the traffic destined for delivery in-
side the deployer nation state can not be diverted away
from deployers without connectivity loss, traffic passing
through the deployer state can. Therefore deployer na-
tions risk the loss of this traffic due to resistor action.
Figure 13 shows a CDF of the fraction of transit traffic
flowing through transit ASes in our simulator that is
bound for a destination in a different nation than the
one the transit AS resides in. As can been seen, for ap-
proximately 80% of transit ASes more than a third of all
transit traffic is bound for a destination abroad. Fully
two fifths of transit ASes see half or more of their traffic
heading to foreign destinations.
When Originators are nation states. In some of the
motivating examples we highlighted TMBs that conduct
surveillance for a nation state. This scenario presents
multiple additional challenges to our resistors. To begin
with, the budgets of spy agencies, as covered in Sec-
tion 5, are far larger than that of NGOs, on the order
of billions of dollars. However, some resistors, for exam-
ple China, can generate deployment costs on the order
of several billion dollars annually against global deploy-
ments. It should also be noted that if multiple resistors
launch economically focused RAD attacks the losses in-
flicted on deployers only increase. Given that one of our
motivating examples is a set of alleged TMBs deployed
by the NSA, it is interesting to consider a deployment
scenario similar to the one just discussed, where the
United States is ringed with TMBs. In this scenario,
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Direct Costs Defection Costs
Legacy 529.7 mil USD 5017 mil USD
Local Pref 496.5 mil USD 4150 mil USD
Path Len 422.7 mil USD 3036 mil USD
Tiebreak 174.2 mil USD 871 mil USD
Table 3. Direct and opportunity costs for ASes belonging to the United
States when a “ring” deployment around the US is resisted by a coalition
of 5% of all ASes.
rather than focus on a single nation state resisting we
consider a coalition of the top 5% of ASes, ranked by
degree of connectivity, acting as a resistor. TMBs are de-
ployed to all ASes which primarily operate in the United
States that have a link to an AS which resides in another
nation. The deployment costs, both direct and those in-
cluding defection costs are shown in Table 3. The first
thing to note is that even though no clean paths exist
into the United States, there are still direct losses on
the order of half a billion dollars annually as a result
of some international transit traffic no longer traversing
through the United States. In addition, we see that de-
fection pressure increases deployment costs by nearly an
order of magnitude for all strategies except Tiebreak.
When the originator is a nation state other com-
plications for our resistor’s attack model exist. For ex-
ample there is the question of whether or not deploy-
ers are allowed to act as rational economic entities. If
the deployers are legally compelled to host TMBs with-
out compensation then the originator would not bear
any of the cost of our resistor’s actions. However, it is
important to note that our resistor’s actions are still
functional, as they provide a strong economic incentive,
which did not exist prior to the resistor actions, for the
deployers to push back against the forced deployment
of TMBs to their network, which is the resistor’s goal
in the first place. An additional complication might be
the surreptitious deployment of TMBs, in such a case a
“deployer” may be unaware of the location or even pres-
ence of TMBs on its network, making defection improb-
able – although with resistor detection and action, high
enough opportunity cost may motivate the deployer AS
to discover these facts.
Finding deployers of TMBs. We note that for sev-
eral examples of TMBs, it is essentially trivial to iden-
tify deploying ASes. Schuchard et al. showed how, in the
original RAD attack, deployers can be identified by us-
ing the decoy routing protocol itself: the efficacy of the
protocol depends on users being able to signal a covert
destination to the TMB. Thus, a given AS path can be
tested using this signal; if the covert destination is re-
trieved, then the path includes a deployer. Repeating
this process with each AS path available to the resistor
allows the resistor to identify the deployers using an in-
tersection attack. Given a known keyword, similar pro-
cesses have been used to identify ASes that manipulate
traffic by keyword filtering [41], ad injection [30], and
DNS injection [12]. Work has even recently been pre-
sented which has had some amount of success detecting
the QUANTUM INSERT infrastructure [21].
More subtle traffic manipulation such as traffic
shaping and protocol differentiation might require prob-
abilistic inferences by the resistor [16, 37], leading to the
possibility of classification errors. In this case, we note
that since the new attacks we discuss have little cost
to the resistor, false positives have limited consequence.
Let C be the cost our attack incurs on a deployer, α be
the true positive rate, and ψ be the false positive rate.
Then a TMB deployer will have expected cost αC under
our attack, and a non-deployer will have expected cost
ψC. Thus as long as α > ψ the attacks will disincen-
tivize deployment; however, compared to manipulations
that can be detected perfectly, the damages will be re-
duced by a factor of (α− ψ). Fully passive surveillance
systems present the most challenging scenario for our re-
sistor, however non-technological detection, for example
through disclosures similar to those of Edward Snowden
could be sufficient for resistors to launch a RAD attack
against all member ASes of a given nation state to place
pressure on the host government.
TMBs Which Require Total Disconnection Read-
ers familiar with Decoy Routers will have observed that
they function so long as any tainted path exists from
a given resistor. In this case our economic resistor will
return to the policy of refusing to send any traffic to des-
tinations which lack a clean path, however the economic
resistor’s position is strengthened via economic pressure
on deployers. By increasing the cost on the originator,
whole more than likely has a fixed budget to spend on
TMB deployment, the resistor can reduce the size of
deployment the originator can field. This in turn means
that there will be fewer end destinations the resistor will
need to cut itself off from when preventing any traffic
from utilizing tainted paths.
Modeling limitations. We note that there are some
limitations to our cost model, which may tend to over-
state the opportunity costs imposed by defection. Ad-
ditionally, variations in pricing and contractual obliga-
tions to other organizations could also complicate the
decision to defect. Without more detailed information
about the pricing policies and exact traffic volumes of
individual ISPs, it is difficult to measure the impact of a
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resistor’s actions with perfect accuracy. The models put
forward in this paper exist to illustrate the concept of
an economically based attack against availability rather
predict exact losses to the last dollar.
The other limitation of our cost model is the fact
that only a single round of deployer incentives and de-
fection is examined. Our defection costs present a max-
imum opportunity cost, as it assumes in each case that
only one AS elects to defect. If two ASes simultane-
ously elected to defect it is possible that the amount
of additional transit traffic they attract is lower than
either expects; a result of the two ASes splitting the
gains. However the opposite direction is also true, two or
more deployers might form a defection coalition, creat-
ing clean paths which previously had multiple deployers.
In this way the single defector scenario is not necessar-
ily a worst-case scenario. An interesting question is what
are originator costs when multiple rounds of deployment
and defection are conducted? Additionally, preferential
routing by our resistor could incentivize other ASes to
build links to resistor ASes in an effort to capture traf-
fic from the resistor which currently has no clean path.
We feel that examining these scenarios is an exciting
direction for future work.
A general concern is the accuracy of our simulated
paths. Because of the nature of resistor behavior, specif-
ically some of the models violating common operator
practices for route selection and export specification,
we can not take an approach similar to RAPTOR [36]
where we only use routes observed in the wild. Even so,
we should generally find a majority of the routes our
simulator selects appearing in the wild at some point
in time. This in fact is true, we find that the major-
ity of our simulated paths are seen in the wild, specif-
ically our simulator aligns with Anwar et al.’s results
that approximately two thirds of routes should be cor-
rectly predicted. A full, table of the fraction of pre and
post RAD attack paths for each of our resistor that we
can observe in use is found in the Appendix. Another
complication that can result in errors in simulated paths
is the existence of peering links between ASes which are
difficult to detect from the outside. In order to test that
our model is insensitive to the existence of such links we
tested our attacks on topologies with additional peering
links added to the topology. We found that in the ma-
jority of cases the addition of more peering links made
our routing capable adversary stronger. This is shown
in Figure 17 and Figure 18 in the Appendix. We elected
to use only the observable AS topology since it resulted
in the weakest adversarial model.
Detection of reverse poisoning. We note that as de-
scribed, the reverse poisoning attack can be detected by
an AS that monitors all incoming route advertisements.
In principle, it might be possible to develop a routing
policy that detects this and counters the poisoning by
re-advertising the aggregate route for each sub-block.
This policy would carry substantial risks of introducing
routing cycles and other instabilities in the BGP infras-
tructure, and thus does not seem to be carried out in
practice. Moreover, non-lying reverse poisoning would
be far harder to detect. Additionally, ASes detecting
non-lying reverse poisoning could only react to it by
falsely claiming they too have the hole punched routes,
something they would be unable to accomplish in the
presence of BGPSec.
7 Conclusion
In this work we demonstrated how a collection of like
minded ASes can fight back against devices that ob-
serve and manipulate their traffic from privileged po-
sitions in the Internet. First, we showed that the orig-
inal RAD attack can be adjusted to reduce costs on
resistors. Through simulation we show that these ad-
justed RAD attacks are still capable of deflecting non-
negligible traffic away from deployers in two likely to oc-
cur deployment models. Second, we demonstrated that
a RAD attack inflicts economic damages on deployers,
which would inhibit a resistor’s ability to find willing
ASes to deploy TMBs. Our experiments demonstrate
that by directing profitable traffic away from deploy-
ers, resistors can financially incentivize ASes to remove
TMBs from their network. By making known the fact
that clean paths are preferentially selected, resistors can
create a Prisoner’s dilemma-like game which causes eco-
nomic pressure to be exerted, even if the resistor can not
currently find clean paths to destinations.
The economic attack we developed creates many in-
teresting questions for future work. First, what happens
when a more long term game is played between resistors
and the originator? Our examination of the pressure to
defect looks at only a single round game. What changes
when the game is run over multiple rounds? What does
the clean path fraction look like when ASes make deci-
sions to deploy or defect over time? What are the actual
economic costs when multiple deployers defect simulta-
neously?
There is also a large amount of work that can be
done examining deployment strategies. Are there de-
ployment strategies that work more efficiently when eco-
nomic concerns are considered? Additionally, we can
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consider how to build resistor coalition. Certain collec-
tions of ASes might be found which function together as
a powerful economic adversary by virtue of their com-
bined connectivity and customer cone.
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Fig. 14. The fraction of traffic originating inside our resistors which
crosses at least one TMB placed in a targeted deployment.
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Fig. 15. The fraction of traffic resistor originated traffic which crosses at
least one TMB deployed as part of a global deployment.
Data: Set of neighbors
Result: Set of neighbors to advertise hole punch
score← 0;
AdvertiseSet← {};
Unadvertised← Neighbors;
repeat
roundGain← 0;
roundChoice← ø;
forall the candidates ∈ Unadvertised do
advertise hole punched route to candidate;
tempScore← current deployer losses;
if tempScore - score > roundGain then
roundGain← tempScore− score;
roundChoice← candidate;
end
withdraw hole punched route to candidate;
end
advertise hole punched route to roundChoice;
score← score+ roundGain;
AdvertiseSet← AdvertiseSet ∪ roundChoice;
Unadvertised← Unadvertised \ roundChoice;
until roundGain = 0;
Algorithm 1: Greedy algorithm for selecting which neighbors
to advertise the hole punched route to. The algorithm does a
test advertisement to each neighbor that has not been selected,
and selects the neighbor which results in the highest deployer
losses. Each time a neighbor is selected the hole punched route is
permanently advertised to them.
Initial Resistor Used
Observed Observed
Brazil 63.2% 46.6%
China 62.2% 42.2%
Germany 56.4% 49.1%
Iran 45.3% 13.4%
Table 4. One way we can measure the accuracy of our topol-
ogy is to compare the routes generated by our software routers
to actual observed routes collected a route reflectors around the
Internet, similar to the approach taken by RAPTOR [36]. We
parsed information from RIPE route reflectors [10] and Route-
Views peering points [32] within a three month window before
and after when our inferred AS relationship dataset was gen-
erated by CAIDA. The first column is the percentage of routes
prior to resistor attacks which appear in the wild. The second col-
umn is the percentage of resistor reaction routes which can be
observed in the wild. The second column is lower as a result of
many of the resistor strategies violating no Valley Routing.
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Fig. 16. Mean AS level path length increase for our collection of RAD strategies operating against the targeted deployment. In all cases the Tiebreak
strategy sees zero path length increase.
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Fig. 17. Change in cost of deployment when our topology has an additional 10% of peering links added. Peering links are difficult to detect and may be
missing from our AS topology. By adding additional peering links in nearly all cases our resistor is stronger.
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Fig. 18. Chane in the cost of deployment when our topology has an added 30% of peering links. Again, our resistors are stronger as a result of the added
links.
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Fig. 19. The mean increase in path length into the resistors as a result of
reverse poisoning against a targeted deployment.
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Fig. 20. The mean increase in path length for in-bound paths to the
resistor as a result of reverse poisoning against a global deployment.
